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IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLICIT TAXES
David A. Weisbach*
N Some Explicit Thinking About Implicit Taxes,1 Professor Charlotte
Crane argues that policymakers, courts, and scholars often miss the
effect of implicit taxes. An implicit tax is simply the effect of taxes on
the price of an asset. For example, if an asset is tax-preferred, the price
will be bid up to reflect the tax preference.
One must think explicitly about implicit taxes to avoid missteps.
Although there is substantial literature on implicit taxes, Crane shows
that many areas of tax policy have not fully incorporated the concept,
pointing out five or six different areas of the law that fail in this regard.
For example, Crane argues that the tax treatment of unpaid interest on a
tax-exempt bond is dependant on whether the price of the bond is sup-
posed to reflect the benefit of tax exemption. Similarly, the pre-tax profit
requirement for tax motivated transactions does not take into account
implicit taxes and, therefore, is likely to be too broad and potentially
incoherent.
Crane's observation is important and surely correct- implicit taxes may
change policy prescriptions. I have two comments. First, I will discuss
what exactly implicit taxes are and why we might care about them. In
doing so, I will expand on some of Crane's arguments regarding implicit
taxes. Second, I will discuss how much we learn from explicitly discussing
implicit taxes in the context of a pre-tax profit requirement for tax shel-
ters. The appropriate treatment of tax shelters is an increasingly impor-
tant topic as evidence mounts of a growing proliferation of aggressive
shelters.2 Yet the definition of a shelter and the appropriate treatment,
once identified, remains uncertain. Crane, as well as others, argue that
implicit taxes are central to a coherent definition. 3 Implicit taxes would
clearly be part of any complete picture, but I will argue that the core of
the problem lies elsewhere.
* B.S., Mathematics, The University of Michigan; J.D., Harvard Law School. Cur-
rently, Associate Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1. Charlotte Crane, Some Explicit Thinking About Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV.
339 (1999).
2. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market for Corporate Tax Shelters, forthcoming
TAX L. REV.
3. See, e.g., David J. Shakow, Confronting the Problem of Tax Arbitrage, 43 TAX L.
REV. 1 (1987); Theodore S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a Teaket-
tle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1994); Alvin Warren, The
Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated Transactions, 59 TAXES 985 (1981).
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I. IMPLICIT TAXES
Implicit taxes are misnamed. Implicit taxes are not taxes in the sense
of the confiscation of resources by the government. They are simply asset
price adjustments in response to a tax benefit or detriment. Tax capitali-
zation is the general concept; assets change price in response to taxes.
The term implicit tax usually refers to a tax benefit. It is the additional
amount one pays for an asset above and beyond the price if there were no
tax benefit associated with owning the asset. So, for example, if a taxable
bond would sell for $100, a tax-exempt bond might sell for $120. The
buyer has paid a $20 implicit tax. But it is not really a tax. It is simply an
allocation of the benefit of tax-exemption between the new owner and
the seller of the asset. The tax law nominally allocates the benefit only to
the new owner, but the owner and seller can split the benefit through a
side payment.4 Between the seller and the owner, the tax benefit is fully
realized and the government in the abstract is indifferent as to how it is
split; implicit taxes initially seem to be simply a matter of private dealings
between individuals, not between individuals and the government.
There are several confusing elements in the term "implicit taxes."
First, while the term "implicit taxes" usually refers to capitalization in
response to a tax benefit, the same logic applies to tax detriments. For
example, stock prices adjust to the imposition of the corporate tax, so
that the return to existing equity is the same as the return to other capital,
notwithstanding the corporate tax. There is an implicit subsidy (i.e., the
opposite of an implicit tax) to the purchaser of the stock that offsets the
cost of the corporate tax.
Second, implicit taxes can be defined by comparison to the no tax state
of the world or the full tax state of the world. The scope of the term will
differ depending on the reference point. If the reference point is the no
tax state of the world, all price adjustments are implicit taxes. If the ref-
erence point is the full tax state of the world, only price adjustments in
response to under or over-taxation of a particular asset or transaction are
implicit taxes. The most common definitions use the fully taxed state of
the world.5 I prefer the no tax comparison as any change in prices from
the no tax world represents a sharing of tax liability between the nominal
payer and other parties. The definition does not really matter so long as
one is explicit.
Even though implicit taxes involve only payments between private par-
ties, the government is not indifferent. To begin with, if a tax benefit is
targeted to a particular group, it is important that the group receive the
benefit. So if tax exemption for municipal bonds is targeted at municipal-
ities, it is important that the sales price of the bond fully allocate the
4. Like any other price, the amount of the side payment is determined by the market.
For example, the difference in price between municipal bonds and corporate bonds, which
is the amount of the side payment, is determined by the market.
5. See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRAT-
EGY 83 (1992).
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benefit in that direction. The government made the lender (the holder of
the bond) the nominal beneficiary, but wants the benefit to be allocated
to the borrower. Therefore, the government usually wants high implicit
taxes on the lender.
In some situations, however, the government wants no implicit taxes.
Suppose the target group for an education incentive, such as the Hope
Scholarship credits, is students. If the price of education is bid up, the
benefit is split between students and schools, which is contrary to the goal
of the tax benefit. Implicit taxes can alter the effectiveness of a policy.
Note also that there is nothing distinctive about tax policy here. Any
government subsidy, tax, or regulation will have price effects that may
redistribute the benefits or costs of the policy.
Crane uses the example of unpaid interest on a tax-exempt bond to
illustrate this concept. Suppose the goal of the exemption is to lower the
cost of borrowing for local governments. The nominal beneficiary of the
exemption is the holder of the bond. To fulfill its objectives, the govern-
ment must hope that the benefit of the exemption is fully capitalized into
the price of the bond, thereby transferring the benefit to the local govern-
ment. In this case, what is the appropriate treatment of unpaid interest?
The government wants all the benefits to go to the issuer so buyers of
taxable bonds and tax-exempt bonds should be in equal places. Not al-
lowing a deduction for unpaid interest comes closest to achieving this, so
no deduction is appropriate.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the government does not want capi-
talization because, for example, the benefit of the exemption is supposed
to stay with the bond holder. We can think of the bondholder as purchas-
ing two things: a set of cash flows from the borrower and a tax benefit
worth (at a 40 percent tax rate) $4 for each $10 of interest paid. What if
the borrower fails to make a payment? There is no reason to also deny
the bondholder the other benefit it purchased, the $4 of tax benefits for
each $10 of interest. There is no reason government nonpayment should
occur at the same time as nonpayment for the borrower. Another way to
think about it is that the linking of the tax benefit to interest payments is
a mere convenience. The same policy could have been implemented by
giving the bondholder a deduction upon purchase of the bond equal to
the present value of the tax benefits under current law. Then there would
be no connection between payment by the borrower and the tax benefits.
Mere conveniences of accounting methods should not affect policy.
The example is troubling because capitalization, or the lack of capitali-
zation, may defeat the arguments just given. Suppose the government
wants the holder of the bond to get the benefit. It therefore wants to
discourage capitalization and, based on the arguments above, should give
a deduction for unpaid interest to benefit the holder. If the tax benefit of
exemption is capitalized, the tax benefit for the deduction for unpaid in-
terest might also be capitalized, defeating the purpose of the deduction.
There would be no benefit to the holder for the deduction. If the govern-
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ment wants the benefit to go to the local government, it will want to en-
courage capitalization and give no deduction for unpaid interest. But if
capitalization is not occurring, it is not clear that either treatment of un-
paid interest will change the result.
Suppose that the arguments above were not affected by capitalization.
It is still not clear what the appropriate treatment is because the treat-
ment of unpaid interest affects tax revenues. To determine correct policy
one would have to determine whether the government should spend
money to achieve its desired result or whether partially achieving its re-
sult at a different cost is better.
The more common example used to illustrate implicit taxes for tax-
exempt bonds is the treatment of borrowing to purchase a tax-exempt
bond.6 Allowing an interest deduction for such borrowing would en-
courage capitalization while disallowing the deduction, as under current
law, discourages capitalization. In any event, leaving aside the details of
the example, the larger point Crane makes is correct. Whether the gov-
ernment policy is to encourage or discourage implicit taxes will often af-
fect one's views of the treatment of a variety of transactions.
Implicit taxes affect norms beyond the effectiveness of government pol-
icy, such as the fairness or efficiency of the tax system. Returning again
to the tax-exempt bond case, it may look like the rich holders of the
bonds get a tax benefit, but not if the benefit is allocated through the
market to the issuers. Thus, implicit taxes can affect vertical equity, or, in
other words, how progressive the tax burden is. Implicit taxes may also
affect horizontal equity. It may look like holders of a tax-exempt bond
pay less tax than similarly situated individuals who do not hold the bonds.
It is correct that holders pay less tax, but they are not better off because
they made a side payment to some state or city that the similarly situated
person did not.
The effect of implicit taxes on efficiency is more complex. If the under-
lying subsidy is inefficient, implicit taxes often only reflect that underlying
inefficiency. As the price of municipal bonds goes up, local governments
find it more attractive to issue bonds and will issue more than they would
if the market alone determined their price. A local government's deci-
sion to fund a project is changed, so that the city may well enter into a
project that could not pass market tests. Implicit taxes achieve this result,
but it is simply a consequence of government policy, not implicit taxes per
se.
In some cases, implicit taxes may defeat what would otherwise be an
efficient policy. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that because individ-
uals are not fully capturing the benefits of education (for example, an
educated public might produce less crime), a government policy is neces-
sary to make market prices better reflect the social costs and benefits.
6. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions be Limited, in Uneasy
Compromise, Problems of Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax 195 (Aaron, Galper &
Pechman, eds., 1988).
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The government might simply subsidize students. But if there are implicit
taxes on education subsidies, tuition goes up, which means individuals
will still not internalize the positive externality of education. Their effec-
tive price will be the same. The program would just be a windfall to
schools.
Implicit taxes can also reduce inefficiencies. For example, if the corpo-
rate tax is capitalized into share prices, there is no reason to repeal the
corporate tax (at least with respect to existing shares) as any inefficiency
has already been born by the initial shareholders. Secondary holders
would just get a windfall if the corporate tax were repealed.
So we care about implicit taxes, but it is difficult to make general state-
ments about which way they cut. Sometimes we want them, sometimes
we do not. Sometimes they create inefficiencies and sometimes they do
not. They usually affect the distribution of taxes and benefits, but the
direction is uncertain. Crane is correct that one must think about them in
a given context, but each case will be different. I know of few general
statements that can be made other than Crane's thesis: that one must
think about implicit taxes in each case.
II. PRE-TAX PROFIT MOTIVE
To obtain tax benefits associated with a transaction, the tax law re-
quires taxpayers to have an expectation of making a profit on the transac-
tion without regard to taxes. For example, in Knetsch v. United States,7
Mr. Knetsch borrowed money from Sam Houston Life Insurance at 3.5%
and purchased an annuity (from Sam Houston) that yielded 2.5%. He
was guaranteed to lose money on the transaction. But tax on the gain
from the annuity was deferred while interest deductions on the borrowing
could be taken immediately. If tax rates were high enough, taxes turned
a losing transaction into a winner. The tax benefits in this transaction
were disallowed.8
It does not take a degree in economics to see that this behavior is inef-
ficient, unless one had some reason to believe that there was a market
flaw causing too few purchases of annuities, even ones that were financed
through a borrowing. In Knetsch, no real resources were used other than
the resources used to plan the transaction. In such a case, where the tax-
payer has literally done nothing, the only cost is the planning cost. In
most cases, however, some resource is misallocated to obtain a tax bene-
fit, in which case the inefficiency consists of both the misallocation and
the planning costs. For example, if Mr. Knetsch had been smarter, he
would have born some risk, say by creating a mismatch between the inter-
est payments and the annuity payments. The transaction would have had
a greater chance of being respected in this case, but it would have created
inefficiencies by misallocating risk.
7. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).8. See id. at 370.
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The pre-tax profit motive requirement is an attempt to limit this type of
inefficient behavior. If a transaction would not clear at least a zero profit
(not a market profit) without taxes, we know the behavior is inefficient.
Taxes for a transaction that fails the pre-tax profit requirement are
negative.
The pre-tax profit requirement has long been subject to criticism. In
1981, Al Warren noted the problem both with implicit taxes and with the
arbitrariness of setting the profit requirement at zero. 9 If there are im-
plicit taxes, what looks like a losing transaction without regard to taxes, is
actually a perfectly sensible transaction. The pre-tax profit motive simply
misses the fact that included in the transaction is a side payment to trans-
fer tax benefits. For example, suppose a taxpayer borrows to buy a tax-
exempt bond. If there were no implicit tax, the return on the tax-exempt
bond would equal the cost of the taxpayer's borrowing, resulting in zero
economic profit, without regard to taxes. If the tax-exempt bond has an
implicit tax, the taxpayer loses money on the transaction, but only be-
cause included in the transaction is a side payment to transfer tax benefits
to the municipality. If one is to ignore tax benefits when determining
profit, one should also ignore the side payments made to transfer the ben-
efits. Either count implicit taxes and real taxes or do not count either.
Ted Sims similarly argues that implicit taxes completely eliminate the
problem with leveraged tax shelters (other than for seller financing,
which at the time had particular flaws not generally implicated in other
shelters).'10 Leveraged tax shelters were the bane of the tax system in the
1970's and early 80's and were arguably the cause of a significant misallo-
cation of resources, such as empty glass buildings in downtown Houston.
Sims' argument was that the price of tax-preferred assets will be bid up so
that there is no advantage to a leveraged purchase of the asset."I If the
taxpayer who borrows to buy tax-exempt bonds pays an implicit tax equal
to the full value of the exemption, the transaction has no after-tax profit
and is not more attractive than non-sheltered investments. Effectively,
the argument is the same as that made above - that critics of tax shelters
were inconsistently counting tax deductions but not implicit taxes. David
Shakow also makes essentially the same argument.' 2
Even aside from implicit taxes, the pre-tax profit test had problems.
The test looks to whether the taxpayer makes above zero. Zero is the
wrong number, because a transaction that made zero, but involved an
investment of capital, would not clear market hurdles. Note that zero
might be the right number if the test used present values determined at
the market rate of return, but the test does not use present values. In
fact, without present values, it becomes almost impossible to compare the
rates of return on different transactions, which makes the test completely
9. See Warren, supra note 3, at 986.
10. See Sims, supra note 3, at 309.
11. See id.
12. See Shakow, supra note 3, at 37.
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incoherent. If the goal is to identify tax-caused distortions, one must re-
quire a market rate of return and require discounting.
It is not clear, however, whether there is a better alternative. After 80
years we do not seem to be any closer to the definition. Perhaps tax
shelters are like obscenity, and further attempts to elucidate the concept
are in vain.
I will not attempt to give a definition of tax shelters here but I would
like to suggest the place to begin looking. The argument is that current
attempts to define tax shelters pay insufficient attention to the legal im-
plementation of the tax system. Instead, these attempts rely too much on
the economics of the transactions, attempting to identify directly efficient
and inefficient transactions. The study of implicit taxes follows this ap-
proach. Ultimately, the economic concepts must be part of any notion of
a shelter, but I believe the hard work lies elsewhere, in the study of the
law, particularly concepts such as the appropriate degree of detail in the
law, the use of rules and standards, the effect of discontinuities in the law,
and other concepts related to the legal implementation of the tax system.
Begin with an attempt to define tax shelters based on economics with-
out regard to the implementation of the law. An investment is worth
making if it has a positive net present value and should be rejected if it
has a negative net present value. Ideally, a tax system would not affect
the decision to make an investment, which means that it should be al-
lowed only if its pre-tax net present value is positive. The tax shelter test
would simply require a zero pre-tax profit when expected cash flows are
discounted using pre-tax prices. To be conservative about which transac-
tions are disallowed, the discount rate can be set lower than the market
rate (for example, at the risk-free rate at which the Treasury borrows).
Then, only projects that have at least a minimum yield without taxes
would be permitted to go forward (at least without a tax penalty).
The problem with this definition of a shelter is that taxes change prices.
If the tax on rice causes one to eat more potatoes, eating more potatoes
cannot be tax avoidance. As Crane says, at some level, the tax system has
to let people take prices as given. Requiring pre-tax prices would force
irrational actions in the face of actual market prices. Implicit taxes com-
pletely undermine the notion of a tax shelter based on pre-tax present
values. Assuming some transactions are tax shelters, the problem be-
comes a complex one of determining when taxes may be considered and
when they may not be. There is no clear economic line.
The problem with implicit taxes occurs even if one uses the more nar-
row definition of implicit taxes: price changes caused by variations from
full taxation. For example, if the price of stock is bid down to reflect the
corporate tax, one should be allowed to purchase stock at its after tax
price even if its pre-tax price would make the purchase irrational. So
again, the problem is determining when tax benefits and detriments
should be taken into account, not whether they should be.
1999]
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One response, advocated by Sims and others, is to reject the notion of a
tax shelter altogether and to believe that implicit taxes will resolve the
problem. Allow people to choose between rice and potatoes, based on
after-tax prices. This inefficiency is what we bought when we chose our
current tax system. To the extent there are special preferences that might
cause further misallocations, these will be quickly eliminated through im-
plicit taxes. For example, if taxpayers were allowed to borrow to invest in
tax-exempt bonds or other tax-favored assets, the price of these assets
would be bid up, creating implicit taxes and eliminating the benefit of the
shelter.
This seems naive for two reasons. First, unless there is full capitaliza-
tion of tax benefits and detriments, implicit taxes will not cure the shelter
problem. Reliance on full capitalization is utopian. Full capitalization
has never happened and is unlikely to ever happen. 13 Second, Mr.
Knetsch's annuity had no implicit tax as it was created out of thin air.
Nothing actually happened, so the prices could have been set arbitrarily
high or low. Implicit taxes cannot cure Mr. Knetsch's shelter, nor can
they cure most modern shelters. These modern shelters, which will be
discussed below, look more like the Knetsch shelter than borrowing to
invest in tax-favored assets.
Al Warren suggests a solution to this problem: he suggests, roughly, to
use a pre-tax profits test (with discounting), except where it is clear that
Congress has enacted an incentive intended to create implicit taxes.14 In
those cases, consider both the tax benefits and the implicit taxes. This
solves both the discounting problem of current law and the problem with
implicit taxes. I think this test moves in the right direction but, by look-
ing to congressional intent, it points to a different underlying problem.
The underlying problem is the way that the law is promulgated-the ad-
ministrative compromises, the lack of perfect information by drafters, the
effect of rules and standards, and other issues relating to the legal imple-
mentation of the tax system.
Consider an example of a modern tax shelter, an abusive transaction
described recently by Joe Bankman.15 Suppose a profitable domestic cor-
poration would like to generate a tax loss to use against its profits. The
strategy is to generate offsetting gain and loss and to have the gain recog-
nized by a nontaxable entity, such as an offshore corporation, and the loss
recognized by the domestic corporation. This can be accomplished in the
following.
A foreign party, not subject to U.S. tax, enters into a straddle on a
currency in a country in which it does not conduct business. For example,
a foreign party, domiciled and conducting business in Nation A, might
13. See Calvin H. Johnson, Inefficiency Does Not Drive Out Inequity: Market Equilib-
rium & Tax Shelters, 96 TAX NOTES 20 (1996).
14. See Warren, supra note 3, at 989.
15. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market for Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999).
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enter into offsetting long and short options in the currency of Nation B.
In time, one option will increase in value and one will decrease in value.
Assume, for example, each option was purchased for an amount equal to
$50 million (U.S. dollars) and that the gain position increases in value to
$90 million and the loss position falls in value to $10 million. The foreign
party sells the gain position and contributes the loss position, with a basis
of $50 million and fair market value of $10 million to an existing subsidi-
ary (Sub) of the domestic corporation (Parent). In return, the foreign
party receives non-voting preferred stock with a value of, say, $11 million.
At the same time, Parent contributes an amount of cash to Sub equal to
10% of the value of the Sub. Parent and Sub take the position that the
transfers of Parent and foreign party are governed by section 351 and
related provisions. Consequently, the Sub takes a basis in the loss posi-
tion equal to its basis in the hands of the foreign party-$50 million. Sub
sells the property and takes a $40 million foreign currency loss, which is
ordinary rather than capital and, therefore, can be used against operating
income.
I chose this example because it has been made public already (most
shelters are marketed under strict secrecy), because it is exotic and suffi-
ciently complex to show how modern shelters work, and because it is suf-
ficiently simple that it can be readily understood. There are hundreds of
similar shelters, and this shelter, while perhaps simpler than many, is
typical.
This shelter does not take advantage of any particular tax subsidy and
is not affected by implicit taxes. It looks like Knetsch, in the sense that it
is totally independent of market prices (it can be done regardless of
prices) and very little has actually taken place. Most modern shelters
have these features.
The underlying problem is how the law was drafted. 16 By allowing an
offshore loss to be domesticated, the tax law created a loophole. The law
was imperfectly drafted and included administrative compromises such as
the realization requirement. The taxpayer took advantage of these flaws.
Determining how to react to this problem involves studying how the law
is best implemented given the inevitability of imperfect drafting and ad-
ministrative compromises. Let me suggest four areas that need further
study before an adequate definition of a shelter can be developed.
First, we must understand the appropriate degree of complexity of the
law and its relationship to tax shelter rules, or more generally, to the use
of rules and standards in the tax law. Eliminating loopholes like the off-
shore currency straddle most often creates additional complexity in the
law. A broad definition of a shelter may reduce the need to create this
type of complexity by preventing loopholes from being exploited. But a
broad shelter definition might deter efficient transactions or might create
uncertainty. To determine the appropriate breadth of a shelter definition,
16. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 365, 473 (1988).
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we must understand the connection between the definition and the com-
plexity and uncertainty of the law. 17
Second, the definition of a shelter will affect the government's incen-
tive to draft clear laws. If there is a substantial backstop to errors in
drafting, it is likely that the drafters will be less attentive to detail. This
may be good or bad, but the definition will affect government incentives
in ways that must be accounted for.
Third, the definition must be related to the sanction. If we were to
execute those who engage in tax shelters we might have a more narrow
definition than if we merely deny them the contemplated tax benefits.
Definitions do not stand on their own. More generally, one must have
views on the costs of under- or over-inclusiveness. An over-inclusive def-
inition will capture some admittedly legitimate transactions. An under-
inclusive definition will let some shelters go. Any real definition will be
both under- and over-inclusive, but the question is how much of each and
how we weigh the costs.
Finally, we must consider the revenue and distributional effects of the
definition. The desirability of a tax rule is determined by its effects on
behavior, its distributional effects, and the amount of money it raises (or
loses). The focus so far has been only on effects on behavior. But a
broad definition will raise more money than a narrow definition. And tax
shelters tend to be concentrated in high bracket groups, so a broad defini-
tion will increase progressivity.
These factors are only a starting point, and we have very little idea how
to answer any of these questions. The questions, however, point to a defi-
nition of shelters that refers to the legislative process and intent behind a
statute, an understanding of the appropriate scope of administrative com-
promises, and the legal implementation of the tax system. Shelters can-
not be defined in the abstract by reference to economic definitions. They
exist because of the necessary compromises in the promulgation of the
law and must be addressed by reference to these compromises.
This is not a criticism of Crane. She makes the more narrow and, I
believe, correct point, that current law is incoherent in its treatment of
implicit taxes and that implicit taxes will ultimately play a role in any
coherent definition of a shelter. Nevertheless, I think the bulk of the
work in developing a response to shelters lies elsewhere.
17. For an initial exploration of this topic, see, David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the
Tax Law, CHICAGO. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999).
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